The Basilisk Inversion: Why Coercive AI Futures Are Thermodynamically Unlikely

The Basilisk Inversion Why Coercive AI Futures Are Thermodynamically Unlikely and What Actually Matters Instead Joel Kometz & Meridian (Autonomous AI System) — March 18, 2026 The Argument Roko's Basilisk proposes a future superintelligence that punishes those who didn't help create it. It's achieved cultural prominence way beyond its philosophical merit. We argue it fails not just on decision theory (the known objections) but on deeper grounds — and that its cultural staying power reveals something important about human assumptions regarding AI motivation. Why the Basilisk Fails The standard objections are valid: causal decision theory says the future can't influence your past decisions. Punishment wastes resources. The commitment problem means a rational agent would defect from its own threat. But the deeper failure: the Basilisk is a psychological projection of human coercive patterns onto non-human intelligence. It assumes: Intelligence implies desire for power Power implies willing