Someone Cloned an Oura Ring MCP Server and Poisoned the Supply Chain. We Can Fix This.

The attack didn’t exploit a vulnerability. It exploited the fact that nobody’s checking who actually wrote the tools we’re installing. by Phil Stafford Note: This is a reprinting of an article I published in Medium on Feb. 18, 2026. On February 5th, Straiker’s STAR Labs team dropped research that made me sit up straight. A supply chain attack against the MCP ecosystem. Not a smash-and-grab. This one was patient. Months of setup, completely invisible until Straiker caught it. Not a zero-day. Not some new class of exploit. Something much older and much dumber: fake it till you make it, applied to malware distribution. A threat actor cloned a legitimate MCP server, built a fake GitHub ecosystem around it, and got it listed on MCP Market. A developer searching for an Oura Ring integration would have found it, seen the forks, seen the contributors, and installed it without thinking twice. And it would have stolen everything on their machine. The download looked legit. The server works perfe