Saving yourself from npm

Context Hackers are hijacking npm packages at an alarming rate. We can't stop maintainer accounts from being compromised, but we can stop being easy targets. In today's ecosystem, the burden of proof has shifted: security is now the responsibility of the person hitting npm install . It's probably fine → Prove it's safe Most devs treat weekly or monthly download counts as a sign of reliability — evidence that a package is well-maintained and solves a real problem. That's reasonable, up to a point. But once a hacker hijacks a maintainer's account and tampers with the package or adds a postinstall script, that download count doesn't reset. All a hijacker needs is a single line in package.json to exfiltrate your ~/.ssh keys or .env file — in a 2-second install. What allows this to happen over and over? Insecure defaults — the tooling runs arbitrary code on install without asking Blind trust — there's no decent way to verify you're getting exactly what you asked for, nothing more Securing y